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Judges and politics: an essay f rom
Canada
Allan C Hutchinson*
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto

'We are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies
clash by night.'

Matthew Arnold 1
It is said of statistics that what they reveal is interesting, but what they

hide is crucial. Much the same can be said of the present British debate
over constitutional change and the courts. The various constitutional
reforms proposed seem to be obvious and long overdue abolishing the
post of Lord Chancellor; setting up a Supreme Court separate from the
House of Lords; and establishing ajudicial appointments committee.
However, at least as presented and dealt with by the government and the
judges, while these innovations are interesting and generally positive,
what they fail to mention or address is much more crucial and revealing.
The government papers and the judiciary' s response resolutely refuse to
tackle the central issue of what it is that judges do and whether it is
done in a suitably legitimate and proper way. For all the sound and fury
of constitutional engagement, the main antagonists share a deep and
disturbing assumption that judicial power has and will continue to be
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I am grateful to Derek Morgan, Luke Woolford and Michael Abdelkerim for their critical comments
and helpful suggestions.

exercised in a non-political, objective and neutral manner. In this paper,
by reference to the Canadian experience, I will challenge that assumption:
it is not that judges are unprofessional or corrupt, but that adjudication is
inescapably political and non-objective. Instead, I will offer a very
different account of the adjudicative performance and propose a more
complementary set of institutional reforms.

I.

What should a Supreme Court do to ensure that the government is meeting
its constitutional responsibilities? Are there limits beyond which judges
should not go in supervising government activities? If so, how are those
limits to be determined? These important issues were confronted by the
Canadian courts in the Fall of 2003 in Doucet.2 While the Canadian courts
had over 20 years of experience under their collective belt in tackling
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, they had not staked out any
comprehensive position on the precise role of courts in remedying
Charter wrongs. Doucet obliged them to reveal their hand a little more
fully. A trial judge had decided that it was incumbent on the Nova
Scotia government to provide French-language secondary schooling
in certain areas. While the government did not deny the parents' rights
under s 23 of the Charter to have such schooling for their children, it
had decided not to prioritise those rights and had delayed fulfilling its

obligations. However, not only did the trial judge order the Province
to use its 'best efforts' to provide school facilities and programmes
by specified dates, he also retained jurisdiction to hear reports on the
status of those efforts. The Province contended that this continuing
judicial supervision inappropriately trespassed onto the government's
political discretion. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed and
held that, while courts have broad-ranging powers under s 24(1) of
the Charter to fashion remedies, the Charter does not extend a court's
jurisdiction to meddle in the details of a Province's administrative
management: there were limits to the courts' authority to interfere with
what were matters of political judgment. A majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada had no such qualms.
By the narrowest of 5-4 margins, the Supreme Court decided that the
Constitution and legal tradition demanded that the trial judge should remain
seized of the issue. Speaking for their colleagues, Iacobucci and Arbour 11
recognised that the courts should be cautious in involving themselves in such
matters. However, the courts must complement their purposive interpretation
of Charter rights with a purposive approach to remedies in order to ensure that
Charter rights are given full and meaningful protection. While the court must
also be sensitive to the limits of its role as judicial arbiter and not interfere
unduly with the roles of the other branches of governance, the judicial
crafting of remedies will vary according to the right at issue and the context
of each case: the advancement of democratic ends should not be

accomplished by undemocratic means. Although the remedy was admittedly
creative and novel, it did balance the parents' rights against the Province's
privilege to decide upon the details of educational planning. Accordingly,
the majority held that, in the particular circumstances of the Nova Scotia
schools and mindful that delay might defeat the parents' rights, a supervisory
remedy 'took into account, and did not depart unduly or unnecessarily from,
the role of the courts in our constitutional democracy'. 3
The dissenters took a much more restrained line and were strongly critical
of the majority's position. Drawing heavily on the common law doctrine of
functus officio, the minority were not at all convinced that the trial judge's
order was clear and maintained that, once a court had issued its decision, it
ought to rely upon the government to act with reasonable diligence and in
good faith: it was not the role of courts to act as direct overseers or
superintendents of the executive function. Moreover, on behalf the minority,
LeBel and Deschamps 11 insisted that it was vitally important that the
courts respect the appropriate constitutional boundaries and balance
between the different branches of government power: democracy demanded
that the judicial role be limited and modest. Although it was imperative that
citizens' Charter rights be properly and fully enforced, the minority took
the definite view that this did not permit the courts to interfere in the
legitimate exercise of executive discretion. Indeed, chastising the majority
for

its

rather

cavalier

approach

to

such

delicate

constitutional

considerations, the minority considered that invasive remedies, such as the
trial judge's in this case, were illegitimate and amounted to a virtual micro-

management of administrative management which 'led to the improper
politicisation of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive' .4
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's decision was greeted with a deluge
of public and academic commentary. 'Activism' was the word on most
people's lips. It sounds as if it is something positive healthy, vital and
purposeful. But, when it is used in connection with courts, many hear it
only as having disturbing negative resonances uppity, illegitimate and
uncontrolled. At the heart of these responses was the concern that the courts
might have gone beyond the bounds of what it is that unelected judges
should be doing in a constitutional democracy; they might have vacated the
realm of legal decisionmaking and trespassed into the arena of political
discretion. The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982
pushed the courts more into the spotlight and asked them to resolve more
controversial disputes. With a higher public profile, the courts' work has come
under closer and more critical scrutiny. Indeed, as the public and academic
commentators tend to be the same people, the only difference between the
public and academic debate is one of greater length and occasional subtlety
of contribution. After over 20 years of debate about the legitimacy and
reach of Charter review by courts over government action, the main thrusts
of the response were predictable and well-rehearsed. On one side were those
who viewed the majority decision as further evidence that the judges had
overstepped the bounds of their authority and competence: it was blatant
and unwelcome

'judicial activism'. By interfering

in the fiscal

administration of public programmes, an unelected, unrepresentative, and

unchecked judiciary had violated the separation of powers and imperilled
'established traditions of responsible government'. Some went so far as to
see the decision as a 'gratuitous and arrogant' power-grab which bordered
on the 'monarchical'. However, on the other side, there was applause for a
bold court which had overcome the pusillanimity of some its members
to provide meaningful and effective protection to people's constitutional
rights. If the Rule of Law was to be truly respected, it was thought
essential that constitutional entitlements be effective remedies; it was not
only desirable, but necessary that governments not be allowed to evade,
complicate, or ignore court orders. Far from imperilling responsible
government, the Doucet decision had contribu ted to the legitimacy of
Canada's democratic commitments by giving the Charter 'muscles' and
'teeth'.5 While both sides have something important to contribute, I am not
convinced that either has taken a defensible or convincing stance: the Charter
debate is much broader and deeper than both sides contemplate or accept.
Consequently, it is important to examine the courts' and the commentators'
arguments at greater length and to explore an alternative viewpoint which
contends that, whether activist or restrained, the judges are involved in an
inevitably and thoroughly political endeavour: all efforts to separate law
from politics are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, while my critique is
decidedly radical, it is not deliberately negative. An acceptance that
adjudication is thoroughly political does not strike the death-knell for
democracy.

II.

The more traditional position is that taken by the minority and championed
by a cadre of conservative academic critics. Accelerated by Charter
adjudication, but not restricted to it, the Canadian judicial system is
considered to have lost its way and to be hastily on its way to political hell
in an activist handcart. The courts, especially the Supreme Court of Canada,
are condemned as

having

become

highly

politicised

and

highly

interventionist in their decisions and judgments. Effectively abandoning
established legal principles and modes of legal reasoning, the judiciary has
unwisely and indulgently shifted its focus to an analysis based on 'values'.
Moreover, unlike the traditional understanding of judicial decision-making,
this resort to values has more to do with a judge's own subjective political
commitments than an objective assessment of a case's legal merits. Critics
charge that, when recent judicial pronouncements are looked at as a body of
work, they have not only become blatantly political, but reflect and
instantiate a particular and partisan set of liberal-feminist commitments. In
effect, these critics charge that 'judicial activism' is not a careless aberration by
an overworked judiciary, but a concerted dereliction of official duty by a
politically motivated judiciary. As such, there is an indignant call to return to
the passive and neutral virtues of judicial restraint so that the promise of
Canadian democracy can be redeemed. Of course, judicial activism has no part
to play in such a restorative vision of law.6
While this nostalgic call for 'judicial restraint' is expressed in the most

passionate and least restrained terms, it has garnered considerable support.
However, while this traditional critique is long on the details of the judiciary's
current political fall from constitutional grace, its adherents are very light on
how a purely legal mode of principled adjudication can be performed. While
these exhortations to 'stick to the law' are seductive, they offer little
suggestion of how such a seemingly prosaic practice can be achieved. At a
theoretical level, three initial observations come to mind. First, the
ascertainment

of

legal

principles

is

itself

fraught

with

political

contamination and content. 'Established' is simply a way of saying that
certain controversial moral or political commitments are now accepted by
the legal community as settled; this is less an endorsement of the principles'
apolitical nature and more an acknowledgement that general acceptance is a
form of political validation. Secondly, the range of established principles is
extremely broad and often encompasses competing maxims; there is no neutral
or non-political way to select between contradictory principles. Thirdly, even if
it is possible to isolate a relevant and exclusive legal principle, it is far from
obvious how that general principle can be applied to particular facts in an entirely
objective or impartial manner.

7

In short, despite the critic's yearning for a

simpler and more professional age, there is no purely technical and non-political
way to engage in a principled mode of adjudication. This is especially true of
the Charter. Not only is what amounts to 'freedom' or 'equality' the stuff of fierce
ideological debate (and how one relates to the other), but how such values are to be
enforced within s l 's 'such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society' merely invites judges to wade even deeper into

the political waters. Adjudication necessarily involves political choice.

The fact is that the dissatisfaction with 'judicial activism' is itself a
political campaign. Behind the traditional rhetoric of principled
adjudication, there is a very definite and partial political agenda. While
it is understandable why such critics would prefer to occupy the neutral
territory of formal constitutional technique rather than contested turf of
substantive political alignment, the effort to portray and promote a nonpolitical mode of constitutional adjudication as being possible and
desirable is a neat but deceptive manoeuvre. When a closer look is taken
at those occasions on which the critics raise the spectre of activism and
those on which they do not, it will be seen that the difference is a blunt
ideological one. Those decisions that do not fit their political agenda
are condemned as activist and those that do fit are defended as
appropriate. The constitutional line is one of their own political making.
In general, those decisions which promote greater equality (for
example, gay rights, aboriginal land claims, etc) are dismissed as activist
and illegitimate, whereas those which defend greater liberty (for
example, election spending, male property rights, etc) are show-cased as
valid exercises of judicial authority. Yet, in terms of their fit with the
opaque constitutional text and the courts' activist tendencies, there is
nothing to choose between them. It is only that some substantive values
are preferred over others. Accordingly, the claim of 'activism' is simply a

veiled criticism that the courts are being too progressive and making
decisions that do not reflect desirable conservative values: any court that
stands by and lets constitutional values be ignored or belittled is at fault.
But there is no technical or purely legal way to decide what those values
are law is politics by other means. The Charter is a contested site for
political debate, not a definitive or neutral contribution to that debate.
Indeed, the Doucet 8 decision itself is a good example of the disingenuity
of those who reject 'judicial activism' in the name of traditional judicial
virtues. As the judgments of the minority reveal, theirs is less a rejection
of political decision-making and more a championing of a particular and
partial view of constitutional politics. Despite repeated incantations
about 'the separation of powers' and that 'the legislature and the
executi ve are ... the principal loci of democratic will', the minority
makes no real effort to demonstrate that this is somehow an accepted
legal principle as opposed to a contested political commitment. It is
not at all that the majority reject these general principles, it is that they
have a different view of what those commitments demand in the
particular circumstances. Moreover, it is unconvincing for the
minority to maintain that the judiciary 'should avoid turning
themselves into managers of the public service'. The entire history of
administrative law confounds such trite observations about the need
to 'avoid interfering in the management of public administration'.

Furthermore, while it is important to recognise that there are
constitutional boundaries to judicial action, those boundaries are not
independently given, but are developed and negotiated by the courts
themselves. While judges must respect that the executive and
legislative branches are 'the principal loci of democratic will' ,9 that is
not the point. In light of the fact that the judges, including members
of the Doucet minority, regularly and rightly interfere with executive
and legislative authority when they breach the Charter, the real point is
when and how they should so interfere as a matter of constitutional
requirement, not whether

they ever

should. Accordingly, the

difference between the majority and minority judgments is not
between legitimate and illegitimate modes of adjudication, but
between competing visions of an appropriate constitutional and
democratic order. Each has to be defended in political terms: there is
simply no method by which to declare that one is more intrinsically
legal and, therefore, non-contestable than another. It hardly advances
the democratic cause to deploy subterfuge and to pass off political
commitments as constitutional mandates. Decisions should be
celebrated or condemned for the substantive values that they uphold,
not for their vague failure to respect some spurious formal
distinction between making and applying law.

III.

The Charter crystallised the long-standing dilemma of the courts in trying to
reconcile their new role as active guardians of fundamental values with the
democratic values and traditions of Canadian society. They had to develop a
way to act decisively as well as legitimately. In the Charter's early years,
judges relied

upon

the old standby

of 'liberal legalism' a sharp

public/private distinction, neutral interpretation, and objective balancing as
a method for legitimising their decisions and reconciling the courts' role
with democracy. However, it soon became clear that this jurisprudential
modus operandi was failing to placate either liberal or more radical critics
who complained that judicial review was not fulfilling its functions as
effectively or as democratically as it might. Not only were the courts'
efforts at preserving a sharp distinction between legal analysis and political
judgment becoming more transparent

and

u nconvincing, but

the

substantive pol itical values which animated their decisions were being
revealed as increasingly outdated and unresponsive to contemporary

Canadian sensibilities. Indeed, 'liberal legalism' was unable to command
a sustained consensus even amongst judges. In response, the Supreme
Court began to nurture a less legalistic and more pragmatic approach to
its constitutional duties. Ironically, these very efforts to bolster their
democratic legitimacy by relying upon an apparently more overt mode of
democratic justification revealed even more starkly how undemocratic the

judges' involvement judicial review under the Charter. w
In recent years, there has been a turn to 'dialogue theory' as an
alternative justification for judicial review. Judges and jurists have begun
to accept that a strictly legalistic mode of constitutional adjudication is not
available or viable and that some reliance upon contested political
commitments is not only inevitable, but also desirable. The primary
concern is less with politicisation itself and more with 'the degree to
which judges are free to read their own preferences into law' .11 As such,
activism is less about whether judges rely on political preferences at all
and more about the sources of such values and the extent to which they
rely on them. Cautioning that judges are not free to go wherever their
personal political preferences take them, the dialogic approach does not
abandon the idea or practice of maintaining a barrier between legitimate
legal analysis and illegitimate political decision-making. Instead, in
contrast to the anti-activists, it is argued that the distinction is much
fuzzier, that the domain of law is much more expansive, and that the
boundary between law and politics is much less breached. However, like
the anti-activists, they do concede that there is a point at which the judges
can be said to be no longer doing law; they will have wandered off into
other parts of the constitutional and political domain. In some important
sense, law is to exist separately from its judicial spokesperson such that
law places some non-trivial constraints on what judges can do and say.

While legal principles are more open and sensitive to political context,
law is not only reduced to the contingent political preferences of the
judiciary.
Consequently, the general thrust of the dialogue theory is that, because
the legislature possesses the final word on Charter matters by virtue of
the s 33 override power, the courts can proceed to engage in a more overt
balancing of political values under the s l 'reasonable limits' provision.
The claim and hope is that the courts and the legislature will engage in an
institutional conversation about the Charter and its requirements on
particular and pressing issues of the day: the courts and the legislators
have complementary roles that enable legislation to be carefully tailored
to meet the government's political agenda and respect Charter values. The
most prominent judicial advocate of a dialogic approach has been Justice
Iacobucci who insists that 'judicial review on Charter grounds brings a
certain measure of vitality to the democratic process, in that it fosters
both dynamic interaction and accountability amongst the various
branches'. In establishing a 'dialogic balance' and 'retaining a forum for
dialogue' between the different branches of government, the courts must
tread a thin, but vital line between deferential subservience and robust
activism. 12 The courts and legislatures are to be dialogic partners in an
institutional conversation to advance shared democratic goals.
While this resort to 'democratic dialogue' does at least concede the

normative nature of Charter decision-making and represent an effort to
get beyond a discredited liberal legalism, it seems to have let the
political cat out of the judicial bag without any plan for getting it back
i n or keeping it suitably leashed. The majority judgments in Doucet
again offer compelling evidence of this claim. Indeed, suspiciously bereft
of any reference to 'dialogic theory', the judgment of Iacobucci and
Arbour JJ spends much of its time, directly and indirectly, trying to repel
the debilitating spectre of judicial activism. Although the majority
emphasise time and again that 'courts must ensure that government
behaviour conforms with constitutional norms but in doing so must also
be sensitive to the separation of function among the legislative, judicial
and executive branches', they are relatively quiet on how that separation
is to be achieved. Eschewing the notion that there is some 'bright line' in
existence, their only serious suggestion is that judges must be thoroughly
pragmatic and contextual in their assessments: 'determining the
boundaries of the courts' proper role, however, cannot be reduced to a
simple test or formula; it will vary according to the right at issue and the
context of each case.' The conclusion that 'the judicial approach to
remedies must remain flexible and responsive to the needs of a given case'
is unlikely to give comfort to those critics who look for some discipline in
or direction to the courts' future performance.
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Indeed, an uncommitted

observer might be forgiven for thinking that, on the question of whether

'law is politics', the court has given up the ghost rather exorcised the
wraith of judicial activism.
Accordingly, with its apparent rejection of judicial objectivity, lack
of normative content and vague invocations of democracy, the most recent
juristic approaches to judicial review actually serve to undermine fatally
the project of justifying Charter adjudication's democratic legitimacy.
Although dialogic theory is intended to calm fears that the courts are
undisciplined and unlimited in their powers, it manages to reinforce the
perception that courts are not only at the centre of the crucial process
through which political discourse and values are shaped and sustained,
but also that courts get to determine the role and contribution of the
other branches of government. The 'degree to which judges are free to read
their own preferences into law' seems to be reducible to the rather
oxymoronic conclusion that they will be as 'free to read their own
preferences into the law' as 'their own preferences' allow. There is a huge
gap between the rhetoric of democratic dialogue and the reality of
judicial performance. Presenting judicial review as part and parcel of a
democratic dialogue merely underlines the extent to which democracy
has become a pathetic caricature of itself. An elite and stilted
conversation between the judicial and executive branches of government
is an entirely impoverished performance of democracy; it is an empty
echo of what should be a more resounding hubbub.

IV.

It is understandable why most judges and jurists wish to ground an

objective practice of judicial interpretation that obviates judicial valuechoices and that does not tread on the democratic toes of legislative or
executive decision-making. However, it is a misplaced ambition and
doomed to failure. As judicial

review involves unelected judges

invalidating the actions of elected legislators or executives, all judicial
review is anti-majoritarian and, therefore, presumptively undemocratic;
no theory can reconcile judicial review with majority rule. The Doucet
minority are surely correct to emphasise that 'the legislature and the
executive are ... the principal loci of democratic will'. 14 Because there is
no way to bring such a project to a satisfactory conclusion, continuing
attempts to do so merely exacerbate the problem of democratic
legitimacy and erode the very confidence that the legal establishment is
trying to maintain. A better response would be to acknowledge that
adjudication in a society of diverse and conflicting politics is an
inevitably ideological undertaking. Once this is done, courts will not
necessarily become otiose or surplus to democratic requirements.
Instead, it might be accepted that both courts and legislatures are
involved in the same game, namely delivering substantive answers to
concrete problems. In doing so, neither courts nor legislatures have a

lock on political judgment about what is the best thing to do. Having
abandoned the crude Bickelian counter-majoritarian challenge to the
courts' democratic legitimacy, 15 the Supreme Court should follow through
on the political logic of its own analysis; it must have the institutional
courage of its own jurisprudential convictions about democracy being
more a formal and majoritarian ideal.
Once liberated from the confining strictures of traditional thinking,
the question of how and whether courts act with democratic legitimacy is
of a very different order and character. The Bickelian difficulty has little
to say about what values are important to democracy other than an
unthinking regard for majoritarian processes. Once the principle of
democracy is accepted to have a substantive as well as formal dimension,
the justification for judicial action must also be viewed in substantive as
well as formal terms. The work of courts need not be judged by their
capacity to be objective and impartial nor by their willingness to be
consistent with, and not interfere with, majority politics. Instead, they
can be evaluated in terms of the value choices that they make and
the contribution that their decisions make to advancing substanti ve
democracy in the here-and-now. If the traditional presumptions that
legislatures are unprincipled and political and that courts are
principled and reasoned are dropped, it is possible to arrive at a very
different understanding and account of the relation between courts

and legislatures. For instance, the conclusion is possible that
legislatures and courts are both principled and unprincipled to
greater and lesser extents at different times and that each can further
(as well as inhibit) the cause of democratic justice on a particular issue
as much as the other. Moreover, as Doucet suggests, reliance on
'principles' is no less political and no more legal in any essential
sense. The more pressing conundrum, therefore, is that, if democratic
procedures do not guarantee democratic outcomes and democratic
outcomes need not result from democratic procedures, how can we
best organise constitutional arrangements so that democracy as a
whole is more than less likely to prevail?
Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry in a constitutional democracy is not
to ask whether the courts have acted politically and, therefore, improperly,
but whether the political choices that they have made serve democracy.
Because this democratic assessment is substantive and political undertaking,
not formal and analytical, it will always be a contested and contestable issue.
Nevertheless, what counts as a democratic decision is not entirely
reducible to a political and, therefore, open-ended debate about what is most
appropriately democratic at the time and under the circumstances. The
formal dimension of democracy insists that some account is taken of the
general institutional location and position of relative governmental
agencies. The fact that legislators are elected and judges are unelected has
some political salience. However, as Doucet evidences, while judges

must respect that distinction, such an allocational decision will itself be
political and context-specific. In determining the courts' role in a functioning
democracy, there is no authoritative and organising metaprinciple to which
the courts ' can resort that is not itself political and controversial. The
scope of the courts' role and power is itself part of the continuing debate
about democracy which is a task of the most enduring and political kind. Of
course, the concern that courts are interfering too much in the political
process is also a valid one. There is a keen need to be vigilant about what
courts are (and are not) doing. Any court that tramples too often on the
policy-making prerogative of Parliament and legislatures is asking for
trouble: judges need to recognise that they are part of democracy's
supporting cast, not its star-performers. But, as the anti-activists fail to
acknowledge, that democratic watch should itself be open and honest. It is
what the courts are being active about which is the key. It is no more or less
political to maintain the status quo than it is to subvert it; conservatism
is as ideological as progressivism.
Despite the denials and resistance of traditional judges and jurists, the
common law is awash in the roiling and mucky waters of political power.
While judges and lawyers claim to keep relatively clean and dry by
wearing their institutional wet-suits of abstract neutrality and disinterested
fairness, they are up to their necks in ideological muck. And this is no bad
thing. Because it is only when judges come clean, as it were, and admit that
they have political dirt on their hands that they will appreciate that
adjudication generally and constitutional adjudication particularly amou nt

to an organic and messy process that has a similarly organic and messy
connection to those social needs which it claims both to reflect and shape. So
enlightened, judges might begin to accept that they are involved in a
political enterprise whose success and legitimacy are best evaluated not by
the courts' formal dexterity and technical competence, but by their
substantive contribution to the local advancement of social justice.
Abandoning the persistent attachment to a false distinction between a
relatively unsoiled practice of principled adjudication and a contaminated
involvement in crude politics would be an excellent place to begin such a
commitment. As long as its practitioners and their juristic apologists
present the constitutional law as an insulated and insular process, courts will
run the considerable risk of being unresponsive to and unreflective of the
needs they are supposed to address. On the other hand, if judges and jurists
are more willing to concede that the worlds of law and politics are
intimately related, it might become possible to give society's needs the kind
of direct and substantive attention that they merit. It is difficult enough for
judges to fulfil their daunting roles without them also pretending at the same
time that they are engaged in an entirely different enterprise. Efforts at local
substantive justice are not enhanced by a mistaken belief that universal or
formal coherence is at stake. Legitimacy is best attained by candour and
frankness, not by denial and dissemblance.

v.
What has all this got to do with the present constitutional upheavals in the

United Kingdom? In particular, what has this Canadian contretemps got to do
with whether the House Lords should be replaced by a Supreme Court? My
answer is 'absolutely everything'. The most important issues confronting the
courts in the United Kingdom today are exactly those which underlie the
Doucet 16 decision and which animate public and academic debate in Canada
today. This is the problem of 'judicial activism' how can and should the
judiciary fulfil its legitimate responsibilities in a way which vigorously
enforces contested constitutional dictates as a matter of law against the
legislative and/or executive branches of government, but which, at the same
time, accepts that it is a body of unelected and unrepresentative bureaucrats
which has no direct democratic mandate to make political decisions? Yet the
main adversaries in the present constitutional ferment in the United Kingdom
seem intent on refusing to acknowledge, let alone deal with, that central
conundrum. Indeed, while they disagree about much, they join forces in their
uncritical acknowledgement that the judicial task has and will continue to be
satisfactorily accomplished. If the threat or fear of judicial activism is seen to
be a problem at all, it is something for other courts and other jurisdictions to
worry about. While the government is at pains to reassure that the need for
reform 'does not imply any dissatisfaction with the performance of the House
of Lords as our highest Court of Law ... [because] its judges have conducted
themselves with the utmost integrity and independence ... [and] are widely
and rightly

admired,

nationally

and

internationally',

the judiciary

congratulates itself on 'the calibre of our existing judiciary, which has
resulted in our judiciary being admired around the world' .17 This is

arrogance, complacency and denial on a grand scale.
As in Canada over 20 years ago, the introduction of a Bill of Rights in the
United Kingdom has not so much heralded in a new kind of adjudicative
performance as highlighted the essentially political dimension of judicial
responsibilities. What was once assumed has now become contested. Or, at
least, it has been challenged in academic quarters and in the more critical
circles of the legal profession. 18 The sad fact is that the judiciary itself almost
wilfully refuses to concede that there might be such an issue, let alone that it
might be confronted. The most that the government is prepared to concede is
that there might be a perceptual problem in regard to the judicial branch of
government: 'the considerable growth of judicial review in recent years has
inevitably brought the judges more into the political eye ... [and it] is
essential that our systems do all that they can to minimise the danger that
judges' decisions could be perceived to be politically motivated.'
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The

judiciary are loathe to even make such a concession. Consequently, the
present debate is really a fauxdebate. Whereas the most crucial challenge
tojudicial performance is relegated to a vague and distant phantasm of
largely foreign concern, the contending forces exhaust themselves (and the
peripheral public) in a much less important wran gle over institutional
arrangements. While it is clearly a positive contribution to the democratic
project not to have the legal system's senior officials being judges, legislators
and, in the case of the senior Law Lord, executives, there will be little genuine
progress made in democratic terms unless and until the political dimension of
adjudication is acknowledged and addressed. Simply to ignore that possibility,

let alone its reality, is an insult to democracy and its citizens.
A glance at the decisions by the House of Lords under the Bill of Rights
give the lie to the claim that adjudication can proceed without any concerns
or qualms about the judges' neutrality and political orientation. Reading
decisions like R v DPP, exp Kebeline and Wallbank might not persuade
critics that the judgments were ideological in any overtly bias fashion, but it is
difficult to resist the minimal conclusion that political values played an
important and integral role in the judges' opinions. 211 This is not to suggest
that the judges acted inappropriately or undemocratically. My charge is
much less crude and much more nuanced. As I have been at pains to point out
in my discussion of Doucet and its aftermath, it is not that the judges act
unprofessionally when they act politically, it is that the professional
performance of adjudication cannot be done without resort to contested
political values. My account does not in any way report that adjudication is
arbitrary or whimsical. Notwithstanding the occasional fall from judicial grace,
there is no suggestion that judges do anything other than make a rigorous and
responsible fist of their judicial duties. However, this does not refute my claim
that law is inevitably and inescapably political in operation and outcome. A
realistic understanding of the judicial function leads to the appreciation that
adjudication is a subtle combination of freedom (ie judges can cobble together
the broad range of available doctrinal materials into the artefacts of their
choosing) and constraint (ie judges are historical creatures whose imagination
and craft are bounded by their communal affiliations, interpretive prowess, and
personal commitments).
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As a profoundly and pervasively political

undertaking,

adjudication

behoves its

participants

and

observers

to

acknowledge that questions about whether decisions are 'politically motivated'
are pertinent and pressing. To ignore flatly and completely such a debate about
law and politics is to offend any account and practice of democracy.

For both the government and the judges, the most contentious item
of constitutional business is the need to protect and ensure 'the
independence of the judiciary'. This is an important mission. However,
the clash between government and judiciary occupies only a small
corner of the overall terrain on judicial independence; it is what is not
debated and disagreed about that is more significant. Both parties seek to
ensure that there is 'sufficient transparency of independence from the
executive and the legislature to give people the assurance to which they
are entitled about the independence of the Judiciary' and that the
perception continues that 'the Law Lords, like the judiciary as a whole,
are independent of the executive and are not susceptible to political
pressure from any direction'.22 While it is important that such shields are
in place, it is by no means obvious that 'judicial independence' is
tantamount to the judiciary being left entirely to its own devices and
desires. If judicial independence is seen only to be about preserving an
almost unaccountable and self-regulated body of constitutional actors, it
will not necessarily serve the broader democratic interests of the polity.
Indeed, as played out between the government and judiciary, there is no
sense in which it might be the politics of the judiciary that is and ought

to be in contention. Again, the shared assumption is that, as long as
the executive and legislative branches of government keep their noses
out, all will be well and non-political because the judiciary can be
entrusted to act in a suitably professional and technical manner. As I
have insisted, this by no means follows. It is axiomatic that the judiciary
be free from government interference whether from the executive or
legislative ann of government. However, even if this is secured, it does
not mean that all allegations of 'politics' have been resolved. There is
much more to politics than whether the judiciary is making decisions
which are favourable to the government of the day. For example,
decisions which go against the government are not by that fact free
from politics. Presumably, decisions which go against the government
can be as equally politically motivated as those that do not go
against the government. Judicial independence, therefore, is about
much more than institutional independence: it is also about political
leanings. 23

VI.

The true colours of the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, the government
(which, of course, is itself staffed by lawyers on these matters) are revealed in
the details of proposed changes to the judicial appointments process. After

all, the 'who' of adjudication is as or more important than the 'what'. As
regards the new Supreme Court, the government's preference is for a 15member Commission (comprising five judges, five lawyers, and five nonlawyers) to recommend a limited number of names to the Prime Minister
who would then make the appointment. Again, the concern is primarily
perceptual: 'whether or not the system really is biased, the perception has
an impact which is real enough.' However, the government concedes that
the appointments must be based on 'merit' because 'the public must have
confidence that judges are independent, impartial and of complete integrity,
as well as possessing the intellectual skills and personal qualities of the
highest calibre which are required for the discharge of their duties'. Not
surprisingly, the judiciary resoundingly echo these sentiments. While
'increasing the diversity of our judiciary ... will help to generate public
confidence in the justice system', the judiciary maintain that it is imperative
that 'best qualified candidate is appointed irrespective of his or her
background' and that the Commission avoid 'becoming so anxious to
achieve diversity that sight is lost of the primacy of merit' .24 Nevertheless,
notwithstanding these reservations, Lord Falconer, the Lord Chancellor,
recently told the Commons' Constitutional Affairs Committee that the new
appointments body must select women and ethnic minority judges. While it
would be up to the Commission to decide on the actual criteria, Falconer did
hint at the fact that 'targets' might need to be set to ensure that a representative
diversity is achieved.25
As viewed by both sides, there is a shared assumption that 'merit' and

'diversity' are somehow independent and unrelated categories: an increase in
diversity will threaten to undermine merit and a reliance on merit will preclude
diversity. This is entirely wrong-headed. First of all, 'merit' is an entirely relative
notion. Whether a person has the necessary capacities and talents to be
successful at a given role or activity will depend upon an evaluation of the
nature and that role. As I hope will now be obvious, what qualities and
characteristics best comprise the 'good judge' will itself be a political and
contestable debate. If,as the British judiciary seem to maintain, the holding of
judicial office is purely about the intellectual and formal attributes of
professional judgment, then there is little point in bothering too much about
diversity. However, if that were the case, there is no reason to expect that the
judiciary would be a starkly un-diverse body as it presently is. Indeed, one
could be forgiven for thinking that greater diversity would indeed be an
improvement in merit because, with no visible minorities on any superior court
and with the first women appointed to the House of Lords only very recently,
there has been a consistent willingness to translate 'background' into 'best
qualified'. But if, as I have argued, adjudication involves an inescapable
political element, it will be important to ensure that the judiciary represents a
broader cross-section of society than it presently does. This is not to argue that
diversity and merit are one and the same thing or that diversity will always be
preferable to merit. On the contrary, it is to argue that diversity and merit are
interconnected. While there is a need for meritorious candidates, it is
nonsensical to believe that only white males possess the necessary meritorious
qualities; this is the very essence of racism.

Recognising that adjudication requires and expects judges to make
choices among competing political values and that there is no neutral
way to make those choices, it will be wise to work towards a process of
appointment which embraces this operating assumption rather than one
which goes to enormous lengths to hide and reject it. By appointing more
women and visible minorities to the courts, the merit of the bench will be
enhanced in that citizens might be reassured that more than one set of
political values and experiences will be in play when judicial decisions
are made. In making this plea for increased diversity, I am not claiming
that identity is a reliable proxy for set values: people of similar backgrounds
and identities do not possess the same politics merely by virtue of that
fact. However, as a pragmatic consideration rather than an ontological
assertion, it can be safely suggested that background and identity matter.
It is a conceit of established groups (white, male, heterosexual etc) to

maintain that professional objectivity is the only valid touchstone of
legal knowledge. Too often that objectivity has turned out to be little
more than those group's own partial and establishment interests in
intellectual garb. If British society were rid of discrimination and had
achieved a genuine state of equality, the appointment of women (visible
minorities, gays etc) to elite institutions (white, male etc), like the
proposed Supreme Court, might not be so urgent or desirable. However,
the fact is, of course, that society is still very much marked by

discrimination and inequality. Accordingly, to be a woman (visible
minority, gay etc) is still to be the object of persecution because of, and
not in spite of, one's identity. Unfortunately, the courts are no less culpable
than any other institutions in this history. Consequently, the
experience of being a woman (visible minority, gay etc) remai ns
critical to a full understanding of what it is to be a woman (visible
minority, gay etc) and why women (visible minority, gay etc) judges
are required in today's society.26
Judicial

independence

must

also

be

balanced

against

judicial

accountability. One of the better ways to achieve that is by way of diverse
appointments through a democratic process. Indeed, the proposal to have the
appointing Commission dominated by lawyers andjudges in terms of
numerical supremacy and controlling influence is simply unacceptable.
There is an inevitable politics to judicial appointments; there always has
been and always will be, even if it masquerades under the dubious label of
'merit'. The choice is not between a political and a non-political process of
judicial appointments. Rather, it is a straightforward choice about whether the
politics of the judiciary or the politics of the public at large, as expressed by its
elected representatives, should prevail. While many will consider this a weak
or even dangerous reform, it is necessitated by the nature and performance
of the judicial function in a twenty-first century constitutional democracy.
Such a politically informed and politically charged process will not
contribute to a greater politicisation of the judiciary because judges are

already and inevitably a thoroughly political group. It will instead bring
those politics into public view and render them more available for public
scrutiny: the politics of the p ublic has more democratic legitimacy than that
of the judges. Hence, the need to ensure judicial independence is not resolved
by abandoning all efforts at accountability. There needs to be a democratic
trade-off between independence and accountability. If judicial independence
is to mean that judges are left almost unregulated in their activities and
behaviour, it is vital that the process by which they are appointed be as
democratic as possible. This most certainly does not mean that the
legislative branches have no role to play as the present debate seems to
suggest. Indeed, it is only with the involvement of these branches of
government that the courts can be entrusted to fulfil their adjudicative
responsibilities in a meaningful, if strained democratic manner.
Mindful of the adage that 'politics is the art of the possible', it is worthwhile
offering some alternative proposals to the tepid proposals for reform put
forward by the government. While there are more radical measures which
might be taken, there are several less extreme steps that could be adopted
which would better incorporate the understanding that law is politics and
that judicial

decisionmaking requires judges to make contested and

controversial political choices.27 The most important innovation would be to
create a more democratic appointments process. This could be achieved by
establishing an independent commission. Any such body would need to be as
diverse and as representative as possible. Accordingly, it might consist of
about 15 members of whom five would be appointed from the House of

Commons, five would be judges, and five would be citizens; tenure on the
committee would be limited to three years and the chair of the Commission
would be one of the lay members. Confident that no particular constituency
(ie judicial, political or lay) had a lock on the Commission's work or
decisions, the Commission's task would be to establish appropriate criteria
for appointment which took seriously the need for a diverse and talented
judiciary. Candidates could be identified either by application, nomination
or search: interviews would be held and candidates would be subject to an
intensive vetting. There could be rules to ensure both geographical
representation (ie two supreme court judges for Scotland and one for
Northern Ireland) and diversity in terms of women and visible minorities.
Also, threshold rules for eligibility in regard to professional experience and
qualification might be relaxed to ensure that otherwise meritorious
candidates are not excluded. Contrary to the government's view that 'it is at
lower levels of the Judiciary that the criteria might need to be re-examined'
,28 such innovations are best made at the highest level in order to confirm
the sincerity and importance of the commitment to diversity and change. In
all its acti vities, the Commission would ensure that diversity was not a
secondary consideration, but a primary component of 'merit'.
The recommendations of the Commission would be final and direct.
The diverse com position and democratic operation of the Commission
would obviate the need for approval by the Prime Minister or confirmation
hearings in Parliament. This is not because such procedures are
'inconsistent with the move to take the Supreme Court out of the potential

political arena', but because the Commission itself will perform such a role
more effectively and will be less likely to turn the appointments process
into a media circus as in the United States. Furthermore, there should be a
complement of nine Supreme Court judges who, except on leave
applications and conflicts, should always sit as a full court: this would not
only reduce the opportunities for inconsistent decisions, but would also
avoid any suggestions of manipulation in panelselection. It cannot simply
be concluded that, whereas 'in the United States, appointments to the
Supreme Court are more political, and therefore there is a stronger possibility
that the composition of the court might affect the outcome, ... this is not the
case in the United Kingdom' .29 Also, there should be a public register of
'judicial

interests' and a tougher

set

of

conflicts

rules

under

a

comprehensive Code of Judicial Conduct which could be administered by the
A ppointments Commission. Judges should also have a fixed tenure of
appointment of no more than 12 years. While the Commission would have
the power to receive complaints and discipline judges, it would not be
able to dismiss judges without formal approval by Parliament. Finally, to
put the performance of the Supreme Court judges on a more secure and less
amateurish footing, there should be a better administrative infrastructure and
support staff: better commu nication on the court's activities could be
developed and executive 'headnotes' of decisions might be provided. While
this package of reform proposals will not guarantee both the democratic
accountability and institutional independence of the judiciary, it will better
deal with the realities of judicial authority and power in a constitutional

democracy.

VII.

Much of the immediate Canadian response to Doucet 30 has been framed by
the concern over whether the judiciary had trespassed on forbidden
political ground. However, there seems a broader and more troubling
dynamic underlying the litigated issue that democratic choice should not
be only between rule by a judicial elite or a governmental elite, but through a
political process that is more responsive to broader constitutional and
democratic concerns. To conceive that the Doucet decision resurrects only the
dilemma of whether courts can or should invade the political domain misses
the main point: courts cannot exercise their powers and responsibilities
without reference to contested values and principles of governance. The real
and neglected issue is not the politicisation of the judiciary, but the democratic
failure of the executive· and legislative in fulfilling their constitutional
responsibilities and mandate. If governments and legislatures were truly
representative and were doing more of what they were supposed to being
doing in a constitutional democracy, the question of what judges do would be
less pressing and more incidental. Ifthere is a crisis in Canadian democracy,
it is to be found in the fact that politicians and legislators are simply not
'democrats' i n the full sense of the term. 'Democracy' is used more as a
rhetorical cloak for elitist practice than a measure and guide for popular
politics. After all, a drop in voter tum-out in federal elections from 76% in

1979 to 61% in 2000 is hardly reassuring.
Ironically, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is viewed
favourably and increasingly so by large majorities in all regions, with the highest
rate of approval of 91% in Quebec, and the lowest of 86% in the West.
Moreover, 71% say that the Court and not Parliament should have the final
say when the Supreme Court declares a law unconstitutional because it conflicts
with the Charter. Indeed, 66% say they trust judges to do the right thing either
all the time or most of the time. Furthermore, 'the Charter is seen as important
to Canadian identity by more people than is the national anthem or the flag' .31
Nevertheless, the fact that public opinion polls show considerable support for
the Supreme Court is less an accolade for judges and more a slap in the face for
politicians, particularly those leaders who preside in and over Cabinet. Judges
can only ever do a second-best job at making up the democratic deficit in the
present performance of Canadian politics. The Supreme Court decision in
Doucet is indicative of that. While the judiciary has some defined and important
function in Canadian politics, it must be limited and partial. Being neither
elected by nor representative of Canadians, judges can never be entirely or
rightly sanguine about the force and solidity of their democratic legitimacy.
On the other hand, while the executive can lay claim to greater democratic
legitimacy, its practical exercise of power offends its democratic pedigree. Too
often, political leaders seem to dance to their own tune rather than that of the
people they represent. Increased 'rule by Cabinet' is hardly that much better
than extended 'rule by the Supreme Court'. While the statistics reveal
interesting support for the courts, they express profound dissatisfaction with

the political leaders: only 22% of Canadians trust their leaders to do the right
thing at all.

To revamp the legislative and executive process in line with greater
popular participation

and political

accountability will require a

monumental effort. Any changes proportional representation, recall
legislation, accountability audits, genuine ministerial responsibility,
referenda etc must themselves be products of the very democratic process
that is to be enhanced. There are no easy solutions to the present
undemocratic trends. However, the debate around judicial activism is
something of a distraction. Improvement in Canada's democratic status
will not come from increased interventions by judges in the micromanagement of governmental policies. Indeed, judicial supervision is a
short-term crutch that actually harms a limping polity in the mediumand
long-term. The replacement of one elite rule (executive) by another
(judicial) can only be considered positive under the most warped sense of
democracy. So, if there is a desire to reign in the judges, there must also be
a commitment to ensuring that elected politicians and officials are living
up to their own and demanding constitutional and democratic
responsibilities. At present, they are palpably not. But simply construing
the democratic challenge as being one about whether the judges stay out
of or stray onto the political terrain is to misrepresent the problem and,
therefore, to hamper any genuine solutions.
Despite the regular rounds of self-congratulation about Canada's

ranking as one of the best societies to live in, there is a serious erosion
of basic democratic precepts.
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The twin foundations of democracy

popular participation and political accountability are going the way of the
polar icecaps. There seems to be an implicit Faustian bargain between
elite and rank-and-file that the price of socio-economic advancement
(which is still questionable when looked at in other than mean or median
terms) is at the cost of democratic involvement. The Charter and its
judicial enforcement are part of that arrangement. Whatever else it means,
democracy demands that there be more power to the people and less to
the elites. Aristocratic rule is no less palatable because judges and
political leaders are the new dukes and barons. And, it is certainly no
more acceptable when such elites wrap themselves in the trappings of
democracy. While there has never been a golden age for Canadian
democracy, what now passes for 'democracy' is an exclusive, sporadic and
sketchy conversation between the judicial and executive branches of
government over what is best for the country. In this exchange, the voices
of ordinary Canadians play no real or substantive role. Of course, a
robust judiciary has a definite role in a vital democracy, but judges can
only ever do a second-best job at making up the democratic deficit in the
present performance of Canadian politics; they are neither positioned nor
skilled to handle such a task. Nevertheless, it is a sign of a healthy
democracy that Canadians are at least arguing about and grappling with

'judicial activism' and its implications for a constitutional polity. If the
present debate about establishing a new Supreme Court is anything to go
by, the British are still in denial and have not even begun to take the
problems seriously 'ignorant armies', 'confused alarms', and 'a darkling
plain' indeed.
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